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Abstract: Over the last two decades, twenty-two states have moved away from traditional
defined benefit (DB) pension systems and toward pension plan structures like the defined
contribution (DC) plans now prevalent in the private sector. Others are considering such a reform
as it is seen as a means of limiting future pension funding risk. It is important to understand the
implications of such reforms for end-of-career exit patterns and workforce composition.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between pension plan structure and retirement timing is
currently limited, primarily because, most state pension reforms are so new that few employees
enrolled in those alternative plans have reached retirement age. An exception, and the subject of
our analysis, is the teacher retirement system in Washington State, which introduced a hybrid
DB-DC plan in 1996 and allowed employees in its traditional DB plan to transfer into the new
plan. Our analysis focuses on a years-of-service threshold, the crossing of which grants
employees early retirement eligibility and, in many cases, a large upward shift in retirement
wealth. The financial implications of crossing this threshold are far greater under the state’s
traditional DB plan than under the hybrid plan. We find that employees are responsive to
crossing the years-of-service threshold, but we fail to find significant evidence that the
propensity to exit the workforce varies according to plan enrollment.
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1.

Introduction
The majority of state and local public sector employees in the United States are enrolled

in defined benefit (DB) pension plans under which the benefit payments promised in retirement
are based on an employee’s final average salary and years of service (National Education
Association, 2016). This is changing, however. In response to rising costs driven by large
funding shortfalls (Backes et al., 2016) and questions about whether traditional plan structures
suit the current public sector workforce (McGee & Winters, 2015), states have increasingly
explored the adoption of alternative plan structures that are more similar to the defined
contribution (DC) plans now prevalent in the private sector (Aubry & Crawford, 2017).1
Understanding how pension plan design affects labor force behavior is important because
these plans create strong incentives for employees to continue working or exit employment at
different points in a career. The conventional wisdom is that the perceived benefit security
provided by traditional DB plans tends to attract workers who are somewhat more risk averse
and that the high financial cost of exiting before reaching important age-service thresholds
strongly encourages retention across these thresholds (Ippolito, 2002; Salop & Salop, 1976).
Alternative retirement plan designs, like DC plans and cash balance plans, tie benefits more
closely to contributions and investment earnings. As a result, benefits tend to accrue more
smoothly over the course of an employee’s career. A concern, then, is that movement away from
DB plans will result in higher rates of employee turnover.2

1

Public sector DC plans, hybrid plans with both DB and DC features, and/or cash balance plans have been
introduced in at least 22 states, including Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
2
Regarding the teaching profession in particular, the National Education Association has maintained that “Defined
benefit plans are a proven tool for retaining accomplished public sector professionals’’ (National Education
Association, 2011).
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Interestingly, while the theory about the retention effects of different types of pensions is
clear, the empirical evidence on this is relatively sparse.3 Ippolito (2002) studied the introduction
of the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) in 1984 that provided new hires with a
smaller DB plan along with inclusion in Social Security and a 401k plan with employer-matched
contributions. He found that the 1984 reform resulted in higher levels of employee turnover
among employees enrolled in FERS relative to previously hired employees who were enrolled in
the pure DB plan.4 Similarly, Quinby (2020) found that when Michigan began placing state
employees in a DC plan and lowered the value of retiree health benefits, employee turnover
increased. Clark et al. (2016) also found an increase in turnover following a shift in from a
traditional DB plan to choice been a hybrid DB-DC plan and a DC plan. In contrast, Goldhaber
et al. (2017) found little evidence that the introduction of a hybrid pension plan with DB and DC
features increased turnover among teachers in Washington State and that rates of turnover were
significantly lower among experienced teachers who transferred from the existing DB plan to the
new hybrid plan.
Regarding the likely relationship between public sector pension structure and end-ofcareer exit decisions (the focus of our analysis), the empirical evidence is limited, with the most
compelling analyses relying on simulation approaches. These analyses use within-plan variation
to parameterize the relationship between the financial incentives embedded in DB plans and
employees’ exit propensities, and several papers use such parameter estimates to simulate the
effects of changing to alternative plan structures (Costrell & McGee, 2010; Knapp et al., 2021;

3

A few older studies compare employee attrition across firms (see Friedberg & Webb, 2005; Gustman et al., 1994;
Gustman & Steinmeier, 1993). A limitation of cross-firm analyses is that it is challenging to disentangle the
influence of pension structure from the influence of other firm-level characteristics that may also influence
employee turnover.
4
As noted by Goldhaber et al. (2017), a limitation of Ippolito’s analysis is that it compared the exit behavior of
employees during two different time periods, roughly a decade apart.
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Ni et al., 2022; Ni & Podgursky, 2016). Their forecasts show end-of-career exit patterns that
exhibit a more normal distribution, with less concentration around age and years-of-service
thresholds related to retirement eligibility.
A concern about using simulations to assess how a change in pension structure would
affect retirement timing is that the simulation models, which focus primarily on the influence of
financial incentives, may fail to account for other factors that play an important role in workers’
retirement decisions. Several recent papers lend weight to this concern. Seibold (2021), for
instance, found that statutory retirement ages served as reference or anchoring points for
retirement timing, and that these anchors were much more influential than specific financial
incentives. Vermeer et al. (2019) find that in addition to the anchoring effects of statutory
retirement ages on workers’ retirement decisions, social interactions with family, friends and coworkers also play an important role. Finally, papers by Brown et al. (2016) and Behaghel and
Blau (2012) highlight the important role that framing plays in workers’ Social Security benefit
claiming decisions.
The lack of more direct empirical evidence on the relationship between pension structure
and end-of-career exit decisions than that provided by simulation models is due to the fact that
the alternative public sector pension plans that have been introduced in a growing number of
states are relatively new. Therefore, few employees enrolled in those plans are of retirement age
and those who are eligible to retire have accrued relatively few years of service. In this paper, we
seek to address that gap in the literature.
We take advantage of the fact that in 1996, the Washington State Teacher Retirement
System (TRS) introduced a hybrid pension plan with DB and DC features and gave members of
the existing DB plan (hired between 1977 and 1995) the option to transfer into the new plan.

3

This allows us to provide direct empirical evidence on the relationship between pension plan
structure and retirement timing by comparing the end-of-career exit patterns of one group of
employees (public school teachers) enrolled in two different types of plans over the same period
of time (2011 to 2017). We also use parameter estimates from Ni, Podgursky, and Wang (2020)
to model exit-probabilities under the two plans and compare these simulation-based results to our
empirical estimates.
We find that teachers in the DB and hybrid DB-DC plans are similarly responsive to
crossing a threshold for early retirement eligibility despite the financial implications of crossing
that threshold being quite different across the two plans. This suggests that the magnitude of
large, end-of-career increases in pension wealth could be reduced while maintaining desired
retention effects. Our findings also suggest that simulation-based approaches to investigating the
implications of pension reform may be misleading if they fail to account for the anchoring
effects of plan rules associated with retirement eligibility.
2.

Background
In this section we describe features of the pension plans that enroll public educators in

Washington State and compare patterns of pension wealth accrual under these plans.
2.1

The Teacher Retirement System in Washington State
Traditional DB pension plans base workers’ benefits on a formula that includes their

years-of-service and end-of-career salary:
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = B ∗ YOS ∗ FAS
The formula multiplies years-of-service (YOS) by the plan’s benefit multiplier B, which is often
between 1% and 2.5%, to yield the worker’s replacement rate. The replacement rate is then
multiplied by the worker’s final average salary (FAS) calculated over a specific number of years.
4

For example, a 30-year veteran teacher with a 2% multiplier would be eligible for a 60%
replacement rate. If the teacher’s average pre-retirement salary was $70,000, then her annual
retirement benefit would be $42,000. Workers may choose to retire and begin receiving benefit
payments once they meet retirement eligibility requirements, which typically require that they
have reached a set of age and years-of-service thresholds.
Public school teachers in Washington State are currently enrolled in one of three pension
plans operated by the Department of Retirement Systems: TRS1, TRS2, or TRS3. Prior to 1977
teachers in Washington State were enrolled into TRS1 a traditional DB plan with a 2% multiplier
and a normal retirement age of 60. Starting in 1977, new hires were enrolled in TRS2, which
increased the normal retirement age to 65. In 1996, the state introduced TRS3, a hybrid plan with
both traditional DB and DC features. Active TRS2 members were able to transfer to TRS3 and
approximately three-quarters of TRS2 members exercised that option.5 Teachers enrolled after
June 30, 1996 were mandated into TRS3 until July 1, 2007. Since then, new enrollees have been
able to choose between TRS2 and TRS3. The analyses presented in this paper focus on TRS2
and TRS3.6
Key features of TRS2 and TRS3 are described in Table 1. Key to the analyses presented
here are the benefit formulas and rules defining retirement eligibility. TRS2 has a benefit
formula with a 2% multiplier, which pays a TRS2 teacher who retires with 30 years of service
(YOS) an annuity equal to 60% of her final average salary. If enrolled in TRS3, which has a 1%
multiplier, that same teacher would receive an annuity equal to 30% of her final average salary in

5

For further discussion of the development of TRS3 and an analysis of members choices to enroll in TRS2 or TRS3,
see Goldhaber and Grout (2016b).
6
We do not study TRS1 in this paper because the great majority of members had reached normal retirement age as
of the beginning of the study period. As described in Section 3, the study period is 2011 to 2017, the period of time
for which we were able to obtain data.
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addition to retirement income withdrawn from her DC account.7 However, TRS3 members who
exit with 20 or more YOS benefit from an inflation protection provision that increases their FAS
by approximately 3% each year between their exit year and the year they begin drawing
retirement benefits.8
Feature
Membership
definition

TRS2
Hired 1977–96
(default)
Hired 2007–present
(opt in)

TRS3
Hired 1977–96 (option to transfer)
Hired 1996–2007 (mandated)
Hired 2007–present (default)

Type

Traditional FAS

FAS component

DC component

Vesting
period

5 years

10 years

N/A

N/A

5%–15%
(employee’s
choice)

Employee
contributions

Set by legislature

0.02 ∗ (𝐹𝐴𝑆) ∗ (𝑌𝑂𝑆)

0.01 ∗ (𝐹𝐴𝑆) ∗ (𝑌𝑂𝑆)

N/A

FAS period

5 consecutive highest
paid years

5 consecutive highest
paid years

N/A

Retirement
eligibility

65 years of age, or
62 years of age & 30
YOS (full benefit), or
55 years of age & 20
YOS (reduced
benefit)

65 years of age, or
62 years of age & 30
YOS (full benefit), or
55 years of age & 10
YOS (reduced benefit)

Benefit
formula

Withdrawal ages
and penalties for
early withdrawal
dependent on
federal tax rules

Table 1. Key Features of Washington State’s Teacher Retirement System
Notes: DB is defined benefit; DC is defined contribution; FAS is final average salary; YOS is years of
service.

The rules defining retirement eligibility are similar for TRS2 and TRS3. The normal
retirement age for both plans is 65, and members can retire as early as age 55 with reduced

7

All contributions to TRS3 made by employees are placed in a personal investment account. Employees can choose
from a discrete menu of contribution rate options ranging from 5% to 15%. For more information, see Goldhaber
and Grout (2016a).
8
For example, a teacher with 20 YOS and an FAS of $50,000 who exited employment at age 50 and began
collecting retirement benefits at age 65 who receive an annual benefit of 0.01 ∗ 20 𝑌𝑂𝑆 ∗ (50,000 ∗ 1.03(65−50) ) =
$15,580 rather than an unadjusted benefit of 0.01 ∗ 20 𝑌𝑂𝑆 ∗ 50,000 = $10,000.
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benefits at 20 YOS (for TRS2) or 10 YOS (for TRS3). Early retirement factors are used to
determine how much benefits are reduced for TRS2 and TRS3 members who opt to retire early.
These factors become more generous when a member reaches 30 YOS, at which point members
hired prior to 2008 can draw unreduced benefits as early as age 62.9
2.2

Pension Wealth Accrual
As noted above, pension wealth accrual patterns under traditional DB plans create

financial incentives to continue working until reaching retirement eligibility, at which point there
is an incentive to leave employment in order to collect retirement benefits. Here, we consider
how members of the TRS plans accrue pension wealth over the course of a career to better
understand how the benefit formulas and retirement rules described above affect the magnitude
and timing of the financial incentives embedded in the TRS plans.
Following earlier work (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009; Goldhaber et al., 2017), we define
pension wealth as the present value of the stream of future benefits a member is entitled to given
his or her current age and years of service:
1

𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑊 = ∑110
𝐴=𝐴𝑠 (

1+𝑟

(𝐴−𝐴𝑠 )

)

∗ 𝑓(𝐴|𝐴𝑠 ) ∗ 𝑏 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑆 ∗ 𝑌𝑂𝑆 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐴 ,

(1)

where 𝐴𝑆 is age at separation, 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑓(𝐴|𝐴𝑠 ) is the probability of surviving to
age 𝐴 given separation age 𝐴𝑆 , 𝑏 is the benefit multiplier, and 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐴 is a cost-of-living
adjustment. We calculate 𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑊 at each potential starting age and year of separation. The pension
wealth calculations for a representative teacher starting her career at age 25 are presented in

With 30 YOS, a member’s benefit is reduced by a factor of 0.98 if she retires at age 61 and by an additional 0.03
for each year between retirement age and age 61 (the early retirement factor for age 55 is 0.80). For documentation
on the early retirement factors for TRS2 and TRS3, see https://www.drs.wa.gov/publications/member/multisystem/
p23earlyretirement.htm.
9
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Figure 1,10 which plots TRS3 DB pension wealth as well as total TRS3 pension wealth assuming
the representative teachers makes the minimum 5% contribution to her DC account and a earns a
5.5% annual rate of return on DC account assets.11
In Figure 1, we see that the rate of pension wealth accrual increases as the teacher gains
experience so that the additional pension wealth earned during an additional year of service
becomes quite large as an employee approaches eligibility for retirement.12 In comparing the
defined benefits provided by TRS2 and TRS3 (represented by the solid blue line and the dashed
red line, respectively), there is relatively little difference in accumulated wealth between the two
plans for teachers who separate with between 20 and 29 YOS; this is because of the inflation
protection provision in TRS3 described above. However, end-of-career pension wealth – once
the teacher has reached early retirement eligibility at 30 YOS – is much larger under TRS2.

10

We assume a 4% discount rate, a 2% COLA, and survival probabilities from the CDC. We discount to age of
separation instead of starting age to reflect the perspective of the teacher deciding whether to retire in the current
school year. Note that employees can choose to delay retirement after separating employment. Conditional on each
potential point of separation, we assume that employees choose the retirement timing that maximizes pension
wealth, and generally refer to separation instead of retirement.
11
The value of the DC component of TRS3 will vary according to employees’ contribution rate choices and returns
earned on their investments. Given the assumed contribution rate (5%) and rate of return (5.5%), Figure 1 reflects a
conservative estimate of total pension wealth accrual under TRS3.
12
As an employee continues to work, DB pension wealth eventually begins to decline when the cost of foregoing
retirement benefits outweighs the value of the larger annuity obtained by gaining an additional YOS and higher FAS
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 1. Pension Wealth Accrual for an Age 25 entrant in TRS2 and TRS3
Notes: Pension wealth calculations are derived from equation (1) for a representative teacher. We assume
a 5.5% discount rate and a 2.75 percent COLA based on the assumptions of the pension plan. We use the
2013 static mortality table based on the RP-2000 Mortality Tables Report adjusted for mortality
improvement using Projection Scale AA. The mortality table can be found at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/n-08-85.pdf. For TRS3, we assume a 5% contribution rate to the DC plan, and a 5.5% rate of return.
Lastly, salary values come from Washington teacher salary schedules in 2012-13 for a teacher with a
Master’s degree.

It is the 30-YOS early retirement eligibility rule that is the focus of our empirical
analysis. Under both TRS2 and TRS3, a member who begins employment at a young age
experiences a large increase in pension wealth when she accrues 30 YOS (note the kink in both
the TRS2 and TRS3 pension wealth accrual lines). Reaching 30 YOS allows her to retire with
full benefits 3 years earlier (at age 62) than if she had separated from employment with 29 YOS

9

(at age 65).13 Key to our analysis is the fact that the magnitude of the increase in pension wealth
when an employee crosses the 29-30 YOS threshold is much larger for TRS2 than for TRS3. In
the case of the representative employee depicted in Figure 1, pension wealth increases by
$478,635 upon reaching 30 YOS under TRS2 compared to an increase in the value of the DB
component of TRS3 of $147,898.14 A limitation of the representation in Figure 1 is that it
reflects the pension wealth effects of crossing the 29-30 YOS threshold at a specific age.
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate how pension wealth accrual patterns differ across a range of
starting ages. We see that the peak level of pension wealth is much larger for employees who
enter the system at a younger age; for instance, a TRS2 member starting at age 25 can accrue a
maximum of about $1.6 million in pension wealth, while a TRS2 member starting at age 50 can
accrue a maximum of around $500,000. Moreover, for both TRS2 and TRS3, the pension wealth
effect of crossing the 29-30 YOS threshold decreases with entry age and is a non-factor for
members who enter at age 35 or later – they will be eligible for full retirement (age 65) before
they accrue 30 YOS. The rate of pension wealth accrual begins to plateau when an employee
reaches eligibility for full retirement (age 65, or age 62 with 30 or more YOS).

13

In fact, because the early retirement factors for employees who separate with 30 or more YOS are relatively
generous (see discussion in preceding sub-section), it is optimal for those exiting teachers to begin collecting a
reduced benefit as soon as possible (as early as age 55) rather waiting to collect an unreduced benefit at age 62.
14
The value of crossing this threshold for TRS3 employees is estimated to be $164,272 in total, but this includes the
DC component which is not affected by the early retirement eligibility rules associated with the 29-30 YOS
threshold.
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Figure 2A. Pension Wealth Accrual TRS2 by Starting Age and YOS

Figure 2B. Pension Wealth Accrual TRS3 by Starting Age and YOS
Notes: Pension wealth calculations are derived from equation (1) for a representative teacher. These
figures use the same assumptions reported in the note for Figure 1.
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There are two key takeaways from the above discussion. First, the increase in pension
wealth as one crosses the 29-30 YOS threshold is much larger for TRS2 than it is for TRS3 –
over 3 times larger for a 25-year-old entrant.15 Second, the change in pension wealth upon
reaching 30 YOS decreases as entry age increases. Therefore, how employees respond to the 2930 YOS threshold would also be expected to vary according to age. Below, we focus on this
variation around the 29-30 YOS threshold to examine how end-of-career exit patterns were
affected by the introduction of an alternative pension plan structure in the form of TRS3.
3.

Data
Our analysis relies on two data sets. The first consists of records maintained by the

Department of Retirement Services (DRS) on active (i.e., currently employed) members of TRS,
obtained through a public records request. The active member records span the fiscal years 201011 to 2017-18 and provide data on member name, employer (i.e., school district), pension plan,
total- and in-year accrual of YOS, and each employee’s status at the start and end of the fiscal
year. The second data set consists of personnel records from the Washington State Office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) S-275 personnel reporting system for public school
employees. The S-275 records include information on teacher characteristics (including age and
experience), position type, position location (school and district), and salary. The DRS and OSPI
data are linked by matching on school district ID and individuals’ full names.16 We also link the
DRS records to district and school-level data maintained by OSPI.

15

Note that while exiting at 30 YOS versus 29 YOS yields higher pension wealth for younger entrants, it does not
yield peak pension wealth. In fact, the year-over-year rate of pension wealth accrual at 30 YOS (if the employee
continues working) is greater than at most other points (the rate at 29 to 30 YOS being a notable exception).
16
We were able to match over 92% of classroom teachers in the S-275 data during the 2011-2017 study period to
corresponding records for the same year in the DRS data. The match rate is 95% percent among retirement-age
teachers (age 55+).
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A technical challenge in linking this data is that the DRS and OSPI calendar years are not
perfectly synchronized, so that it is common in the data for TRS members to have non-integer
levels of YOS. This stems from teacher contracts tending to begin in September while DRS data
are reported for the fiscal year running from July 1st to June 30th. For example, in their first year
of service, teachers often accrue 10/12 months (i.e., September through June) = 0.83 years of
service credit. Among TRS members in our study sample with YOS ∈ [29, 30], 53% are reported
as having precisely 29.83 YOS. It is also common for teachers who do not appear in the S-275
administrative in September of year t+1, and who are therefore identified as exiting employment
in year t, to continue accruing service credit during July and August of year t+1 of the DRS data.
Among the 186 teachers in our study sample who exit employment with between 29.83 and
29.99 YOS and are under age 64, 86% retire with 30+ YOS. Given these patterns in the data, we
round up YOS values to the next integer when the decimal value of YOS is greater than or equal
to 0.83.
In Table 2, we present summary statistics as 2011 for members of TRS2 and TRS3 who
were hired prior to 1996 – the first year in our panel of data. As noted above, the pre-1996 hires
were able to choose whether to stay in TRS2 or transfer into TRS3 when TRS3 was introduced
in 1996. Consistent with prior work that analyzed that transfer decision (Goldhaber & Grout,
2016b), we observe a number of differences in the characteristics of TRS2 and TRS3 members.
TRS2 members are older but slightly less experienced, more likely to be female, and less likely
to hold an advanced degree. They are also far less numerous – roughly three quarters of teachers
eligible to transfer to TRS3 did so (Goldhaber et al., 2017).
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Teacher characteristics
Age
YOS
Exits employment
Female
Advanced degree
Ethnicity
American Indian
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
School characteristics
Ethnicity
American Indian
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Percent Free/Reduced Lunch
Observations

TRS2

TRS3

TRS2-TRS3

54.08
18.79
0.07
0.74
0.67

52.34
22.07
0.05
0.66
0.77

1.74***
-3.28***
0.02***
0.08***
-0.10***

0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.92

0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.95

0.00*
0.01*
0.01***
0.00
-0.03***

0.02
0.07
0.05
0.18
0.62
0.35

0.02
0.06
0.04
0.17
0.65
0.33

0.00***
0.01***
0.01***
0.00**
-0.03***
0.02***

4,276

14,286

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Statistics are calculated as of the 2010-11 school year for teachers who were hired prior to 1996
and were eligible to transfer from TRS2 to TRS3. The stars represent the p-values of a t-test of the
difference in the mean values for TRS2 and TRS3: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

In Figure 3, we consider a descriptive comparison of the raw proportion of teachers who
separate from employment under TRS2 and TRS3 conditional on having a given level of
service.17 We focus on “exits” rather than “retirements” because we are interested in teachers’
decisions to remain in or exit from the public educator workforce; “retiring” in the context of
TRS means a worker has begun drawing retirement benefits, which often occurs several years
after exiting employment as a teacher. Each vertex in the figure represents the ratio of the

17

We suppress output under 10 YOS and over 33 YOS. Few teachers hired prior to 1996 have fewer than 10 YOS
during the period covered by our data (2011 to 2017) and cell sizes are small above 33 YOS.
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number of teachers exiting with a given level of service to the total number of teachers observed
with that level of service. Consistent with the financial implications associated with crossing the
29-30 YOS threshold, we see a large upward shift in the propensity to exit at 30 YOS and that
the shift is larger among members of TRS2 than among members of TRS3. A limitation of this
descriptive comparison (which will be addressed in the more formal analysis below) is that it
does not account for an employee’s age. As shown in Table 2, the average TRS2 member is
older than the average TRS3 member and the gap in the exit probability at 30 YOS shown in
Figure 3 may be age-driven rather than plan-driven.

Figure 3. Separation Probabilities for Teachers, by YOS and Plan Type
Notes: Each vertex represents the ratio (The number of teachers exiting with X YOS)/
(The number of teachers observed with X YOS) during the period 2010-11 to 2016-17. Observations =
100,190.

15

4.

Empirical Approach
We are interested in understanding how substantial differences in the financial incentives

created by employer-sponsored pension plans may influence employees’ end-of-career exit
decisions. In comparing TRS2 and TRS3, we observe large differences in the magnitude of the
opportunity cost of exiting. As discussed above, this difference is particularly stark around the
29-30 YOS threshold, which is the focus of our analysis.
We begin by considering whether the propensity to exit increases as employees cross the
29-30 YOS threshold, regardless of plan enrollment. We do this to determine whether teachers
are in fact responsive to the corresponding increase in pension wealth; if they are not generally
responsive, it would be difficult to interpret a finding of differential behavior between TRS2
versus TRS3 teachers. We estimate the following logistic regression model on the sample of
teachers with 29 or 30 YOS:
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒,𝑌𝑂𝑆 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator for whether teacher 𝑖 exits in year 𝑡. Because the financial
implications of exiting with a particular level of YOS vary substantially with age, we fully
interact indicators for 𝐴𝑔𝑒 and 𝑌𝑂𝑆 to generate the vector of indicator variables 𝛼.18 This allows
us to compare 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 30) to 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 29) given employee age. The
model controls for a vector of employee characteristics which prior work has shown to be
predictive of retirement timing, including gender, having an advanced degree, and ethnicity
(Coile & Gruber, 2007). We also include school characteristics (including percent FRL and the
ethnic composition of the school) that have been shown to be related to teacher attrition
(Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002), and school-year fixed effects (𝛾𝑡 ) to control for time18

The variable 𝐴𝑔𝑒 represents an employees age as of June 30th in the current year. The variable 𝑌𝑂𝑆 is rounded
down to the nearest integer.
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varying factors that may influence the odds of exiting (e.g., changing economic conditions or
stock market fluctuations). Hence, the identification of the coefficients of interest (the vector of
indicators 𝛼̂) comes from within-year variation in the propensity to exit.19
Our primary hypothesis is that, because the financial implications of the decision to stay
or exit around the 29 to 30-YOS threshold are much larger under TRS2 than TRS3, exit patterns
around that threshold will differ according to plan enrollment. To test this, we modify the vector
of indicators 𝛼 in equation (2) by adding an interaction for plan enrollment:
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝐴𝑔𝑒,𝑌𝑂𝑆 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

(3)

We can then test whether the increase in the propensity to exit as employees move from 29 YOS
to 30 YOS is greater under TRS2 than it is under TRS3:
[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] −

(4)

[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] > 0.
It is important to note that differing exit behavior among members of TRS2 and TRS3
identified by these models is likely to reflect the influence of the financial incentives created by
the pension plans as well as the self-selection of employees into each plan. As noted above, the
members of TRS3 observed in our study sample opted to transfer from TRS2 to TRS3 when it
was introduced in 1996 and the differing financial incentives created by the two plans would
have played a role in the transfer decision. In the context of our analysis, the selection and
financial incentive effects reinforce one another. For instance, a teacher who anticipated exiting
employment with 29 YOS would have had a financial incentive to self-select into TRS3 when
given the option to do so in 1996. Hence, we would interpret the finding of a positive difference

19

Reaching important eligibility thresholds under Social Security and Medicare are also likely to influence
employees’ exit decisions. All employees in our study sample are subject to the same eligibility rules, which are age
dependent and controlled for by the vector of indicators 𝛼.
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in the inequality described in equation (4) as an upper bound on the true plan-driven difference
(i.e., absent the influence of any sorting effects).
5.

Results
In this section, we examine whether employees are generally responsive to the 29-30

YOS threshold and then explore the main research question of this paper: whether
responsiveness to the 29-30 YOS threshold is different between TRS2 and TRS3.
Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of exiting employment by age and YOS. We see
a great deal of variation in the propensity to exit across both age and YOS. That said, at every
age, the probability of exit is higher among teachers with 30 YOS than among teachers with 29
YOS. This pattern could be due to the high opportunity cost of exiting when relatively young. To
see this, consider the pension wealth plot in Figure 2a, which shows that a TRS2 member who
reaches 30 YOS at age 55 can gain roughly $500,000 in pension wealth by staying in the
workforce for an additional seven years.
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Figure 4. Marginal Exit Probabilities for Teachers With 29 and 30 YOS, by Age
Notes: The figure represents output generated from the estimation of equation (2). There are 5,459
teacher-year observations in the regression model, and standard errors are estimated using the delta
method. The graphical output is restricted to the 55 to 63 age range for presentation purposes.

In Table 3, we look at the increase in the propensity to exit as employees cross the 29-to30 YOS threshold and test the difference Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − Pr (𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆 29). For
example, at age 55, the probability of exit is 4.8 percentage points higher among teachers with 30
YOS than among teachers with 29 YOS. This difference in the probability of exit is statistically
significant at every age level, ranging between 4.8 percentage points at age 55 and 28.7
percentage points at age 61. Broadly speaking, these results indicate that employees are generally
responsive to the pension incentives present at the 29-30 YOS threshold and that the degree to
which the propensity to exit increases upon reaching 30 YOS is highly dependent on age.
Estimated Effect and Standard Error for
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Pr(Exit = 1 | 30YOS) – Pr(Exit = 1 | 29YOS) = 0

Lower CI

Upper CI

Age 55

0.023

0.074

0.029

0.091

0.026

0.097

0.099

0.191

0.041

0.133

0.063

0.174

0.217

0.356

0.179

0.351

0.182

0.369

Age 56
Age 57
Age 58
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63

0.048***
(0.013)
0.060***
(0.016)
0.061***
(0.018)
0.145***
(0.023)
0.087***
(0.024)
0.119***
(0.028)
0.287***
(0.036)
0.265***
(0.044)
0.275***
(0.048)

Table 3. Difference in the Predicted Probability of Exit Between 29 and 30 YOS
Notes: Estimates test differences in predicted probabilities derived from the estimation of equation (3).
The reported effect is (Pr(Exit = 1 | 30YOS) – Pr(Exit = 1 | 29YOS)). There are 5,459 teacher-year
observations in the regression model. Standard errors are estimated using the delta method.

Turning to the question of whether the propensity to exit around the 29-30 YOS threshold
varies by plan, Figure 5 presents predicted probabilities derived from the estimation of equation
(3), which interacts indicators for age and YOS with an indicator for plan enrollment. The lefthand panel shows the predicted probability of exit at 29 YOS for TRS2 and TRS3, and the righthand panel shows an equivalent plot at 30 YOS. Generally, this figure suggests that the exit
patterns among members of TRS2 and TRS3 are similar to one another (the confidence intervals
for the two plans clearly overlap).
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Figure 5. Marginal Exit Probabilities for Teachers With 29 and 30 YOS, by Age and Plan
Notes: The plots present predicted probabilities derived the estimation of equation (3). There are 5,400
teacher-year observations in the model, and standard errors are estimated using the delta method.

In Table 4, we test whether the increase in the propensity to exit upon accruing 30 YOS
is higher among members of TRS2 than it is among members of TRS3. Specifically, we perform
a one-tailed test of significance on the inequality expressed in equation (4) by age level:
[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] −
[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − Pr (𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] > 0.20 The estimated effect
sizes are generally close to zero (ranging from -0.039 to 0.035) and contrary to expectations, the
increase in the propensity to exit upon reaching 30 YOS is smaller for TRS2 than for TRS3 for
20

Note that indicator coefficients for TRS2 29 YOS at ages 57 and 59 cannot be estimated because no teachers were
observed exiting within these bins, and thus, are treated as precise zeros for calculating predicted probabilities. AgeYOS-Plan bin sizes range from 34 to 58 for TRS2 and from 90 to 413 for TRS3. The bins with no exits have 49 and
46 observations at age 57 and age 59, respectively.
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six of the nine age levels considered. In no case do we find that the increase in exit propensity
among TRS2 employees is significantly higher than among TRS3 employees. and at some age
levels, the upper bound of the difference (at a 95% level of confidence). However, at most age
levels, the upper bound of the estimated effect is quite large, resulting in some ambiguity about
what we can conclude from this model specification.
Estimated Effect and Standard Error for
[Pr(Exit = 1 |TRS2 30YOS) – Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS2 29YOS)]
– [Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS3 30YOS) - Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS3 29YOS)]

Upper Bound
(95% level of
confidence)

Age 55

0.045

Age 56
Age 57
Age 58
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63

-0.025
(0.043)
-0.010
(0.047)
-0.039
(0.04)
-0.011
(0.06)
-0.009
(0.06)
0.023
(0.074)
-0.016
(0.082)
0.025
(0.102)
0.035
(0.108)

0.068
0.026
0.088
0.091
0.144
0.119
0.194
0.213

Table 4. Difference in Probability of Exit between TRS2 and TRS3, by Age
Notes: Estimates test the difference represented in equation (4). Predicted exit probabilities are derived
from the estimation of equation (3). There are 5,400 teacher-year observations in the model, and standard
errors are estimated using the delta method. Output is truncated to the age 55-63 age range for
presentation purposes.

To improve statistical power, we take advantage of a pattern exhibited in Figure 5 – that
the relationship between age and quit propensity is similar for TRS2 and TRS3. We modify
equation (3) so that age is no longer interacted with plan:
22

𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑌𝑂𝑆 + 𝛿𝐴𝑔𝑒,𝑌𝑂𝑆 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

(5)

The estimated effect described by equation (4), now pooled across age levels, is presented in
Table 5 for the overall sample in column (1) and for teachers aged 60 to 63 in column (2).21 In
both models, the sample is restricted to teachers under the age of 64 because we estimate a single
pension plan effect across ages (𝛼̂) and reaching 30 YOS does not have implications for early
retirement eligibility beyond age 64.
All Ages
(1)
-0.011
(0.035)

Age 60+
(2)
0.007
(0.048)

Upper Bound
(95% level of confidence)

0.047

0.086

Teacher-year Observations

4,873

1,534

Effect

Table 5. Pooled-model specifications
Notes: Each column reports results from a logistic regression reported in equation (5). In column (2), the
sample is restricted to teachers age 60+. The model also includes controls for teacher characteristics
(gender, ethnicity, and Master’s degree) and school characteristics (percent ethnicity and FRL), and
school year fixed effects. The reported Effect is [Pr(Exit = 1 |TRS2 30YOS) – Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS2
29YOS)] – [Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS3 30YOS) - Pr(Exit = 1 | TRS3 29YOS)].

As before, we fail to find evidence that the increase in the propensity to exit upon
reaching 30 YOS is for TRS2 than for TRS3. In the pooled models, the estimated effect sizes are
close to zero (between -0.011 and 0.007) and are more precise. The upper bounds on these
estimates exclude effect sizes of 4.7 percentage points (all ages) and 8.6 percentage points (age
60+). The general effect sizes of crossing the 29-30 YOS threshold (presented in Table 3)
average 15.0 percentage points (across all ages) and 23.7 (age 60+).

21

We also estimated specifications replacing the age indicators with a quadratic in age and found similar results.
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6. Applying a Simulation Approach to Modeling TRS2 and TRS3 Exit Probabilities
As previously discussed, prior analyses of the relationship between pension structure and
retirement timing have tended to adopt a simulation approach to studying the implications of
changing pension plan structures. To help consider our findings in the context that literature, we
apply a simulation-based approach to predicting exits under TRS2 and TRS3; for this we use the
Stock-Wise model and parameter estimates from Ni and Podgursky (2016) and Ni, Podgursky
and Wang (2022)22. In this model, a teacher chooses to either continue working or exit by
comparing their expected utility from leaving with their expected utility from continuing to
work. When a teacher’s expected utility from leaving exceeds their expected utility from
continuing to work, the teacher leaves.23 Our implementation of the model accounts for
retirement wealth accrued under TRS2 and TRS3 as well as the value of Social Security
benefits.24
We assume that teachers’ pension benefits, salaries, and Social Security benefits are
predictable. This leaves only two sources of uncertainty: mortality and preference shocks. For
mortality, we use the tables dictated for use under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) that are compiled and updated by the IRS.25 Following Ni, Podgursky and Wang
(2022), we model preference shocks as an AR(1) process with normally distributed annual
errors.26 To estimate the probability of exit using the structural model, we run 1,000,000

22

Specifically we use the parameters estimated pooled sample in Ni and Podgursky (2016). To improve the fit for
Washington’s teachers, we increased the disutility of work parameter, κ to equal one.
23
See section 6 of Ni, Podgursky and Wang (2022) for a detailed description of the model.
24
The value of Social Security benefits is calculated using the method described in Equation 1 and the Social
Security benefit formula described in the Social Security Annual Statistical Supplement in Appendix D.
25
Specifically we use the 2013 static mortality table based on the RP-2000 Mortality Tables Report adjusted for
mortality improvement using Projection Scale AA. The mortality table can be found at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/n-08-85.pdf.
26
See Section 6 of Ni, Podgursky and Wang (2022) for a more thorough description of preference shocks.
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simulations for each plan and relevant entry age allowing for varying preference shocks and
calculate the probability of exiting in each year across simulation runs.
We simulate exit probabilities for both TRS2 and TRS3 to understand how well the
model predicts exit patterns for the traditional DB and hybrid DB-DC plans. We expect the
structural model to peform well in predicting exit probabilities for TRS2 because previous
research has demonstrated strong performance in DB plan contexts (Kim et al., 2021; Ni et al.,
2022; Ni & Podgursky, 2016). For the hybrid plan, we expect the simulation model – which is
primarily focused on the influence of financial incentives – to predict a response to crossing the
29-30 YOS threshold that is substantially smaller than that predicted for TRS2. And given our
empirical results, which failed to find any significant difference in exit behavior between TRS2
and TRS3 around the 29-30 YOS threshold, we expect that the simulation model will not peform
as well for TRS3.
In Figure 6, we compare the exit probabilities forecast by the simulation model to the
actual exit probabilities presented in Figure 5. The upper panel compares simulated and actual
exit probabilities for TRS2 and the lower panel does the same for TRS3. While there are
moderate deviations between forecast and actual exit probabilities for both plans, the largest
deviations between forecast and actual exit probabilities are occur under TRS3.
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Figure 6. Comparison of Option Value Model and Actual Exit Probabilities
Notes: Hollow points represent a simulated probability of exit using the Stock-Wise OV model described
above and solid points replicate the empirical estimates presented in Figure 5.

To think about the simulation results in the context of our empirical analysis, it is worth
revisiting the hypothesis motivating that analysis: Because the financial implications of the
26

decision to stay or exit around the 29 to 30-YOS threshold are much larger under TRS2 than
TRS3, exit patterns around that threshold will differ according to plan enrollment. In Section 5,
we evaluated this hypothesis by testing the inequality expressed in equation (4).
[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆2, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] −

(4)

[𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 30) − 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑅𝑆3, 𝑌𝑂𝑆 29)] > 0.
Here, we calculate the quantity on the left-hand side of equation (4) using the exit probabilities
forecast by the OV model for each age level between 55 and 63. The results are presented in
Table 6 alongside our primary empirical results from Table 4.
Empirical Estimates
Difference
Upper Bound
Age 55
Age 56
Age 57
Age 58
Age 59
Age 60
Age 61
Age 62
Age 63

-0.025
(0.043)
-0.010
(0.047)
-0.039
(0.04)
-0.011
(0.06)
-0.009
(0.06)
0.023
(0.074)
-0.016
(0.082)
0.025
(0.102)
0.035
(0.108)

Option Value Model
Difference

0.045

0.079

0.068

0.098

0.026

0.118

0.088

0.136

0.091

0.152

0.144

0.169

0.119

0.194

0.194

0.250

0.213

0.230

Table 6. Comparison of Empirical Estimates and Option Value Simulation Results
Notes: The reported “difference” refers to the left-hand quantity expressed by equation (4):
[Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝑇𝑅𝑆2,30 𝑌𝑂𝑆 − Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝑇𝑅𝑆2,29 𝑌𝑂𝑆 ] − [Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝑇𝑅𝑆3,30 𝑌𝑂𝑆 − Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡) 𝑇𝑅𝑆3,29 𝑌𝑂𝑆 ].
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The exit probabilities forecast by the simulation model reflect an expectation that exit
patterns around the 29-30 YOS threshold will differ according to plan enrollment, and
substantially so. The simulation model forecasts that the shift in the propensity to exit as a
teacher crosses the 29-30 YOS threshold will be 7.9 to 23.0 percentage points higher among
TRS2 members than among TRS3 members, depending on age. This stands in contrast to our
empirical results, which did not find any systematic difference between TRS2 and TRS3 on that
measure.
In fact, the differences between TRS2 and TRS3 implied by the simulation results fall
outside of the upper bounds of our empirical estimates at every age level. The discrepancy
between the simulation results and those based on observed behavior suggest that simulationbased approaches to modeling exit behavior may struggle to predict how significant changes in
pension plan structures will affect employee retention, especially in the presence of influential
eligibility thresholds.
7.

Discussion and Conclusions
Pension plans can create strong incentives for employees to continue working or exit

employment. With a growing number of states consider the adoption of alternative pension plan
structures, it is important to understand how such change may impact the probability of exiting
the workforce. However, direct evidence on the relationship between pension plan structure and
retirement timing is limited since most of the states that have adopted alternative pension plan
structures did so relatively recently such that few employees enrolled in those plans have reached
retirement age.
The introduction of a hybrid DB-DC plan (TRS3) to Washington State’s Teacher
Retirement System in 1996 – and the ability of previously hired employees to transfer (from
28

TRS2) into that plan – has provided us a unique opportunity to empirically address the question
of how moving to alternative plan structures might influence end-of-career exit patterns. Our
analysis focuses on the point at which members of both TRS2 and TRS3 obtain eligibility for
early retirement at 30 YOS and experience a large increase in pension wealth. Importantly, the
increase in pension wealth upon reaching 30 YOS is much larger for members of TRS2 than
TRS3. While employees in both plans are indeed responsive to crossing the 29-30 YOS
threshold – they are far more likely to exit after reaching 30 YOS than at 29 YOS – we fail to
find evidence that the propensity to exit varies according to plan enrollment. We also present
evidence that this observed pattern of exit behavior differs substantially from the patterns of exit
behavior forecast by simulation models, which predicted that TRS3 employees would be
significantly less responsive to reaching the 30 YOS threshold than would TRS2 employees.
Our findings suggest that while the financial incentive created by the 30 YOS has a large
impact on employees’ propensity to exit, the marginal effect of the financial incentive on the
propensity to exit is negligible in the space between TRS2 and TRS3. Two mechanisms may be
driving this result. First, consistent with a literature that has found that social norms, statutory
retirement ages, and co-worker peer effects can influence retirement timing independent of any
financial incentive to retire at a particular age (Behaghel & Blau, 2012; Brown & Laschever,
2012; Lumsdaine et al., 1996; Vermeer et al., 2019), employees may be anchoring to the 30 YOS
early retirement rule independent of the financial implications of that threshold. Second, it is
possible that the magnitude of the financial incentive created by the 30 YOS threshold is large
enough that the marginal effect of changing it is negligible. In other words, the financial
incentive effect may have plateaued.
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While our analysis is quite narrow in its focus on the 30 YOS early retirement threshold,
the findings are quite relevant to the broader debate around the role pensions play in employee
retention. It is common for members of public-sector DB plans to experience enormous increases
in pension wealth upon reaching a particular threshold of age and service (Costrell and
Podgursky, 2009). But beyond their (intended) effect on employee retention, such large increases
in pension wealth do not appear to have a clear policy purpose, while presenting significant
downsides to employees who exit prematurely (see, for example, McGee and Winters (2019)).
Taken at face value, our findings suggest that the magnitude of pension wealth increases created
by retirement eligibility rules could be significantly reduced (in the case of TRS2 versus TRS3,
by as much as half) while maintaining desired retention effects. Of course, this would represent a
significant change to the system which could induce different behavioral responses due to new
norms, or the messages that teachers receive (e.g., from labor groups) about the system.
Importantly, our findings also suggest that simulation-based approaches to modeling how
shifts in pension structure will influence employee exit patterns may be misleading if they fail
account for the anchoring effects created by plan rules and potential plateaus in financial
incentive effects. More specifically, such models will tend to overstate the influence of changes
in financial incentives that arise from shifts in pension plan structures.
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